

TAB A

SUMMARY OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
FOR THE  
ABOLITION OF NON-OPERATIONAL POLYGRAPHY  
(OBJECTIVE B57103)

A. Expected effects of abolition of non-operational polygraphy

1. Loss of information

The elimination of the polygraph interview as a part of the applicant clearance process could be expected to result in an information gap which would handicap the Office of Security in making clearance decisions, and the elimination of the capability in investigating allegations against employees would seriously interfere with resolution of such allegations. While it has not conclusively been demonstrated that the presence of the polygraph itself contributes something that a straight interrogation by the same interrogator could not produce, experience strongly suggests this to be the case.

2. Diminished protection against hostile penetration

It seems reasonable to assume that the Agency's polygraph program has some deterrent value in inhibiting hostile penetration attempts. Presumably, the current screening program is regarded by opposition elements as a significant obstacle to infiltration, and the threat of repolygraphing bars any exploitation operations. Should non-operational polygraphy be eliminated, it is prudent to assume that the opposition would be encouraged to step up penetration attempts.

3. Diminished motivation for security discipline

It also seems reasonable to assume that the possibility

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of repolygraphing is a significant deterrent to major individual employee misbehavior. The absence of this deterrent must be considered as potentially removing an inhibition to careless, compromising, or even treasonable behavior.

#### 4. Effects on employee morale

While taking a polygraph test is not regarded by many employees as a particularly enjoyable exercise, and while the removal of this function would produce a superficial relief on this basis, most seem to regard it at worst as a sort of necessary evil and as a mutual guarantee of bonafides among colleagues. Should the program be dropped, there is a strong possibility that employees would feel less confidence in one another.

#### B. A proposal for substitute procedures

##### 1. Sequential interviews

A series of interviews widely separated in time, each having a rather specific function, seems the best approach. The following is a suggested model:

a. The recruiter performs a more intensive screening interview with additional security emphasis added to present procedures.

b. If the recruiter believes the subject is a viable candidate, he sends the subject to a field security agent trained in interview/interrogation techniques.

c. This interrogator fills out the subject's PHS by means of careful, detailed questioning of subject. Information not remembered or unknown to the subject would be researched by the subject after this interview.

d. After this interview, the subject writes a biographic statement (as long as he chooses).

e. PHS plus report of additional information and

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Impressions of interrogator plus biographic statement are submitted as a basis for field investigation which is then initiated.

f. Still viable candidates are sent to Headquarters for IB interview which roughly corresponds to present Phase I - Phase II question lists. Interrogation is as extensive as interviewer feels necessary. A mandatory report on each subject includes the interviewer's assessment.

2. Step up other personnel security measures

Frequent and thorough RIP programs, formalized CI responsibilities for supervisors, and rigidly enforced compartmentation.

3. Develop and evaluate other measures of individual security risk factors

It is possible that the very legislation which would abolish non-operational polygraphy would also abolish the testing suggested below.

a. OMS/Psychiatric Staff has encouraged IB to develop its own test for assessing security risk factors. It was suggested that we start by screening cases DL'd on the basis of information developed by the polygraph to create a model of repetitive patterns exhibited in the DL'd cases. Following formation of the model, OMS suggests that a test can be developed in which individuals can be assessed by comparison with the model. The validation of the test can be accomplished at present while there is no immediate urgency to substitute for the polygraph procedure.

b. OMS/Psychological Services Staff feels that such tests are a questionable substitute for polygraph because of the difficulty in validating the tests. The validation would be laborious and costly while the tests might result in low reliability.

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employees, seems to have been validated and, according to [REDACTED], has a high reliability factor. The problem with this test, however, is that it has a very narrow ban (dealing only with honesty) and there is no assurance that it could be redesigned to suit Agency needs.

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